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The Single-Headed Fourth Branch: Judge 
Kavanaugh, PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, and the Future of the Social 
Security Administration 
Joy Merklen* 
“You’re fired.”—Donald J. Trump1 
INTRODUCTION 
Even a cursory study of Justice Brett Kavanaugh shows he likes two 
things: beer2 and the unitary executive theory.3  From the start of his time 
on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge4 Kavanaugh focused on presidential 
control over the administrative state.  In just his second year on the 
bench, Judge Kavanaugh penned a passionate dissent in Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.5  There, Judge 
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California, Berkeley.  I would like to thank Professor Richard Levy and the members of the Kansas 
Law Review for their thoughtful review of this Comment and Neil Dryden for invaluable assistance, 
editorial and otherwise.  
 1. The Apprentice: Meet the Billionaire (NBC television broadcast Jan. 8, 2004). 
 2. See Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018, 4:56 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript/ [https 
://perma.cc/L3L6-PWMZ] (“I like beer.  I like beer.”).  On day five of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Hearing on Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Judge Kavanaugh, in discussing Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s sexual assault allegations, uttered the 
word “beer” twenty-nine times.  See id.  
 3. See, e.g., Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation of Powers During the Forty-Fourth Presidency 
and Beyond, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1459–62, 1484 (2009) (endorsing the unitary executive theory 
by announcing a policy preference for a strong executive functioning free from “unnecessary 
distractions,” including the investigation, indictment, or prosecution of a sitting President); Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2137 (1998) (using the 
unitary executive theory to argue that a President should be immune from prosecution while in 
office).  See also Nomination of the Honorable Brett M. Kavanaugh to Be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States (Day 4): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th 
Cong. 4 (Sept. 7, 2018) (testimony of Professor Peter M. Shane) (“Judge Kavanaugh’s record on 
issues of presidential authority demonstrates that he has become an activist . . . .  Judge Kavanaugh 
is not just an enthusiast for presidential power; he is a campaigner.”). 
 4. Because this Comment focuses on Justice Kavanaugh’s opinions during his time on the 
D.C. Circuit, it will predominantly refer to Justice Kavanaugh as Judge Kavanaugh. 
 5. See 537 F.3d 667, 685–715 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
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Kavanaugh argued that two layers of protection for executive officers 
from removal at will by the President violates separation of powers by 
unduly diluting the President’s control over the executive branch.6  When 
the case reached the Supreme Court two years later, the 5–4 conservative 
majority largely agreed with Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent.7  Free 
Enterprise Fund buttressed the unitary executive theory to expand 
presidential control of agencies and chip away at the constitutionality of 
independent agencies.8 
On July 9, 2018, President Trump nominated Judge Kavanaugh to 
fill Justice Kennedy’s seat on the United States Supreme Court.9  In his 
Senate questionnaire submitted to the Judiciary Committee in advance of 
his confirmation hearing, Judge Kavanaugh selected his dissent in Free 
Enterprise Fund as his most significant opinion.10  Judge Kavanaugh also 
listed his dissent in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau,11 a more recent opinion that addresses the constitutionality of 
independent agencies with a single-head structure, as a “significant 
constitutional opinion[]” he has authored.12  Indeed, he is correct.  Judge 
Kavanaugh’s PHH dissent, if followed by the Supreme Court, will 
 
 6. Id. at 686 (“[T]he President is two levels of for-cause removal away from [Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)] members, a previously unheard-of restriction on and 
attenuation of the President’s authority over executive officers.  This structure effectively eliminates 
any Presidential power to control the PCAOB . . . .”).  
 7. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) 
(holding “dual for-cause limitations” on removal “contravene the Constitution’s separation of 
powers”). 
 8. The Free Enterprise majority insisted that its decision was unremarkable.  See id. at 507–
08.  But that assertion is hard to square with the majority opinion’s broad language appealing to the 
unitary executive theory, which opened the discussion of the President’s removal power by quoting 
Article II’s Vesting Clause and James Madison’s statement in the First Congress that “if any power 
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those 
who execute the laws.”  Id. at 492 (citation omitted).  The Court stressed that “a single President [is] 
responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch,” id. at 497 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 
681, 712–13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)), and that measures to dilute the President’s control over 
the executive branch “subvert[] the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed–
–as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on [their] efforts,” id. at 498.  In dissent, Justice 
Breyer noted that he “s[aw] no way to avoid sweeping hundreds, perhaps thousands of high-level 
Government officials within the scope of the Court’s holding, putting their job security and their 
administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk.”  Id. at 538–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 9. Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh Is Trump’s Pick for Supreme Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/WKY2-LFTZ]. 
 10. Questionnaire for Nominee to the Supreme Court submitted by Brett M. Kavanaugh to the 
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 43 (2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo 
/media/doc/Brett%20M.%20Kavanaugh%20SJQ%20(PUBLIC).pdf [https://perma.cc/3NKL-X2ZG] 
[hereinafter Senate Questionnaire]. 
 11. 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 12. Senate Questionnaire, supra note 10, at 63. 
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reshape the law concerning presidential control over the administrative 
state and raise serious questions about the constitutionality of important 
independent agencies,13 including, perhaps most directly, the Social 
Security Administration (SSA).14 
In PHH, Judge Kavanaugh argued that the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) Director’s for-cause removal protection 
violates the Constitution’s separation of powers by vesting “substantial 
executive authority” in a single individual unaccountable to the 
President, rather than a multimember body.15  Judge Kavanaugh 
characterized PHH as a “much starker case of unconstitutionality than 
Free Enterprise Fund.”16  Although PHH will not make its way up to the 
Supreme Court (neither party petitioned for certiorari),17 the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear the constitutional challenge in another case.18  Judge 
Kavanaugh’s dissent also remains alive in the lower courts.19  Several 
 
 13. Independent agencies are typically defined by for-cause removal restrictions.  See Jacob E. 
Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 
347 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2376 (2001) (stating that the President’s removal power is 
“the core legal difference” between independent and executive agencies); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 426 (1990) (“An agency is independent 
if Congress has provided that its members can be discharged by the President only for specified 
causes.”).  But see Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 776 (2013) (challenging the consensus view and 
arguing that “not all agencies considered independent possess such a clause”). 
 14. See infra Section II.C.  
 15. PHH, 881 F.3d at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[T]he heads of executive agencies are 
accountable to and checked by the President; and the heads of independent agencies, although not 
accountable to or checked by the President, are at least accountable to and checked by their fellow 
commissioners or board members.  No independent agency exercising substantial executive 
authority has ever been headed by a single person.  Until now.”). 
 16. Id. at 190. 
 17. Neither party petitioned for certiorari presumably because, while the en banc court upheld 
the constitutionality of the CFPB’s design, it vacated the CFPB’s $109 million fine against the 
mortgage company.  See id. at 83–84 (majority opinion). 
 18. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law LLC, 140 S. Ct. 427 (Oct. 18, 2019) (No. 19-
7) (mem.). 
 19. See, e.g., Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 659–72 (5th Cir. 2018) (relying heavily on 
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in PHH in finding the single-head structure of the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) unconstitutional), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 938 F.3d 553 (5th 
Cir. 2019) (reinstating the panel’s finding that the FHFA’s single-head structure is unconstitutional), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal 
Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (expressly adopting Judge Kavanaugh’s 
PHH dissent in finding the CFPB’s structure unconstitutional but rejecting Judge Kavanaugh’s 
severance remedy), appeal docketed, No. 18-2743 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2018).  But see Bhatti v. Fed. 
Hous. Fin. Agency, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1206, 1215–17 (D. Minn. 2018) (noting in dicta that even if the 
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the FHFA’s structure, their claim would fail on the merits, 
agreeing with the en banc D.C. Circuit’s “thorough opinion” in PHH and finding Judge Kavanaugh’s 
panel opinion “unpersuasive”), appeal docketed, No. 18-2506 (8th Cir. July 16, 2018); Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Think Fin., LLC, No. CV-17-127-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 3707911, at *2 (D. 
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cases raise similar constitutional challenges, including an appeal in the 
Second Circuit from a district court decision expressly adopting Judge 
Kavanaugh’s PHH dissent.20  Further, the Fifth Circuit in Collins v. 
Mnuchin applied Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to invalidate the structure 
of the Federal Housing Financial Agency (FHFA).21  Unsurprisingly, 
Seila Law LLC’s petition for a writ of certiorari in Seila Law LLC v. 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau refers extensively to Judge 
Kavanaugh’s PHH dissenting opinion.22 
Judge Kavanaugh’s approach reflects an inherent distrust, widely 
shared among conservatives, of the modern administrative state.  His 
dissent in PHH characterizes independent agencies as comprising a 
“headless fourth branch of the U.S. Government” that “pose[s] a 
significant threat to individual liberty and to the constitutional system of 
separation of powers and checks and balances.”23  This characterization 
of independent agencies resurrects the post-New Deal critique that 
helped fuel the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act,24 and in so 
doing, indicates a desire to reopen the seemingly settled debate about the 
constitutionality of the modern administrative state.  Given that recent 
Supreme Court cases have already applied the unitary executive theory to 
expand presidential control and that several individual Justices have 
questioned the conventional separation of powers analysis undergirding 
the administrative state,25 it behooves administrative law scholars to 
 
Mont. Aug. 3, 2018) (finding it “appropriate to follow [the en banc D.C. Circuit’s PHH decision] to 
determine that the structure of the CFPB comports with the Constitution”); Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau v. All Am. Check Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-356-WHB-JCG, 2018 WL 9812125, at *2 
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 21, 2018) (finding the CFPB’s structure constitutional “for the same reasons stated 
in PHH Corp.”), appeal docketed, No. 18-60302 (5th Cir. Apr. 24, 2018). 
 20. RD Legal Funding, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 784. 
 21. See Collins, 896 F.3d at 659–72.  The FHFA, like the CFPB, is headed by a single director, 
rather than a multimember body.  12 U.S.C. § 4512(b) (2012).  After an en banc rehearing, the Fifth 
Circuit reinstated the part of the panel opinion finding the FHFA’s structure unconstitutional.  
Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 588 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 
(U.S. Sept. 25, 2019).  
 22. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
No. 19-7 (U.S. argued Mar. 3, 2020), 2019 WL 2763117. 
 23. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
 24. Martin Shapiro, A Golden Anniversary?: The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 19 
REG. 40, 40–41 (1996). 
 25. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (holding that Administrative Law 
Judges (ALJs) of the Securities and Exchange Commission are “‘Officers of the United States[]’ 
subject to the Appointments Clause”).  The Trump administration did not hesitate to use Lucia v. 
SEC to increase executive control of the administrative state.  Guidance on Administrative Law 
Judges After Lucia v. SEC (S. Ct.), July 2018, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1120–22 (2019).  Shortly 
after the Court handed down its opinion in Lucia, the Trump administration issued an executive 
order exempting all ALJs appointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 from competitive selection and 
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assess the implications of Judge Kavanaugh’s PHH dissent going 
forward.  The implications are threefold: (1) a reframing of analysis to 
focus on an agency’s unaccountable power; (2) serious doubts about the 
constitutionality of the SSA; and (3) further erosion of the doctrinal 
foundations of independent agencies. 
Part I of this Comment examines the unitary executive theory.  It 
then details the doctrinal framework for presidential removal power 
arising from Supreme Court precedent and reviews the D.C. Circuit’s 
PHH decision and the Fifth Circuit’s Collins decision.  Section II.A 
argues that Judge Kavanaugh’s PHH dissent and the Fifth Circuit’s 
Collins decision dramatically depart from the Supreme Court’s removal-
power precedent and assesses how Judge Kavanaugh’s approach might 
relate to the removal-power doctrine.  Section II.B begins with the 
following premise: if the Supreme Court adopts Judge Kavanaugh’s 
approach, it must develop coherent standards to determine, in Justice 
Scalia’s words, “how the balance is to be struck.”26  Protecting individual 
liberty is certainly a broad purpose of the separation of powers, but it is 
not a judicially manageable constitutional standard. 
This Comment articulates a workable framework for assessing the 
constitutional validity of for-cause removal provisions under Judge 
Kavanaugh’s approach.  In particular, it identifies three critical 
categories of factors courts must scrutinize to determine the 
constitutionality of an agency’s independence: (1) the nature and scope 
of power Congress confers upon the agency; (2) internal political control; 
and (3) external political control.  In so doing, this Comment 
demonstrates that Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal power 
transforms the SSA—an independent agency upon which sixty-four 
million Americans depend27—into an agency subject to the political 
whims of a President.  It reaches this conclusion after assessing the 
cumulative effect of the SSA’s structural features, including: (1) the 
nature and scope of power congressionally conferred upon the SSA; (2) 
the lack of indirect political safeguards; and (3) the lack of external 
political control. 
This Comment concludes by cautioning against the adoption of 
 
examination and a subsequent guidance memorandum “extending Lucia’s reasoning to all ALJs and 
‘similarly situated’ non-ALJ adjudicators.”  Id. (citing Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 
(July 10, 2018); Memorandum from the Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Agency Gen. 
Counsels, Guidance on Administrative Law Judges After Lucia v. SEC (S. Ct.) (July 2018)). 
 26. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 27. See Benefits in Current Payment Status, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/ 
ProgData/icpGraph.html [https://perma.cc/96KX-B5JA] (last visited Jan. 16, 2020) (stating that 
64,064,496 beneficiaries received benefits at the end of December 2019). 
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Judge Kavanaugh’s approach because, despite his assertions to the 
contrary, it lays the groundwork for invalidating all independent 
agencies, reviving a separation of powers that sharply constrains the 
modern administrative state.  This Comment questions the assumption 
that presidential control over administrative agencies would increase 
accountability.  If the accumulation of unchecked power is the problem, 
then the disease worsens with the treatment.  Deliberative accountability, 
fostered by administrative law practices such as notice and comment and 
judicial review, offers a valuable check that will be sorely missed if 
sacrificed to the executive. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Control of Officers 
The President has three means of controlling administrative 
agencies: appointment, direct oversight, and removal.  This essential 
source of presidential power, however, is subject to both constitutional 
and statutory restraints. 
1. The Unitary Executive Theory 
The debate over the scope of executive power dates back to the 
founding.28  But legal scholars agree that Article II contemplates a 
“unitary” executive controlled by the President.29  The Vesting Clause 
vests the executive power in the President, not the executive branch.30  
Similarly, the Appointments Clause gives the President, rather than the 
executive branch, power to appoint “Officers of the United States,”31 and 
the Take Care Clause imposes a duty on the President to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”32  This reflects the framers’ belief that 
a strong, unified executive was necessary for political accountability and 
prompt, concerted responses to national crises.33  While it is clear that the 
 
 28. Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 323, 
324 (2016). 
 29. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN 
LEGAL CONTEXT 83 (2d ed. 2015).   
 30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
 31. Id. § 2, cl. 2.  
 32. Id. § 3. 
 33. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 421–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003) (“Energy in the Executive . . . is essential to the protection of the community against foreign 
attacks . . . .  That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.  Decision, activity, secrecy, and 
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President has control over executive officers, legal scholars continue to 
debate the extent of that control and its implications for administrative 
agencies in general, and independent agencies in particular.34  The 
Supreme Court has thus far rejected the extreme view that the 
Constitution contemplates a rigid, absolute unitary executive.35  Both 
constitutional and statutory checks and balances constrain the President’s 
control over the executive branch. 
2. The Removal Power 
The President’s removal power is generally considered as “perhaps 
the key means” of control over executive officers.36  The mere threat of 
removal allows the President to exert powerful political pressure on the 
policy direction of administrative agencies.37  The President’s removal 
 
dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than 
the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities 
will be diminished.”).  
 34. Compare Datla & Revesz, supra note 13, at 769 (arguing that all administrative agencies 
“should be regarded as executive and seen as falling on a spectrum from more independent to less 
independent”), Shane, supra note 28 (challenging the originalist argument for the unitary executive 
theory), and Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (challenging the unitary executive theory), with STEVEN G. CALABRESI & 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO 
BUSH (2008) (arguing in favor of a strong unitary executive), Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (same), and Steven 
G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992) (same). 
 35. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620, 631–32 (1935) (rejecting the 
unitary executive theory by allowing Congress to limit the President’s power to remove 
commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office”); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688–93 (1988) (reaffirming the Court’s 
rejection of the unitary executive theory in Humphrey’s Executor and permitting Congress to limit 
the Attorney General’s power to remove an independent counsel appointed to investigate the 
executive branch to “good cause”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
561 U.S. 477, 483–84, 501 (2010) (invalidating two layers of for-cause removal protection, an 
“unusual situation, never before addressed by the Court,” without displacing Humphrey’s Executor 
and Morrison).  
 36. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 501 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales 
ed., 1834)); GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 29, at 85 (“In practice, the most important control a 
President has over administrative officials is the ability to remove them from office.”); see also 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132 (1926) (“Made responsible under the Constitution for the 
effective enforcement of the law, the President needs as an indispensable aid to meet it the 
disciplinary influence upon those who act under [them] of a reserve power of removal.”).  But see 
Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (1997) (arguing that the removal power has “limited real-world 
significance”). 
 37. See Cary Coglianese, The Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential 
Control of the Administrative State, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 43, 57–58 (2017) (“Outside of criminal acts, 
the threat to remove an agency head is probably the most serious threat that any president can wield 
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power sparked some of the earliest and most critical constitutional 
disputes in U.S.  history,38 in large part because, aside from the 
Impeachment Clause,39 the Constitution contains no provision expressly 
authorizing the President to remove executive officers.40  The topic was 
never even discussed at the Constitutional Convention.41  Nevertheless, 
the Court has long recognized that the President has an inherent power of 
removal.42  Congress, however, often places statutory limits on the 
President’s power to remove executive officers.43  After all, an officer 
who holds office “only during the pleasure of” the President “cannot be 
depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the 
latter’s will.”44  Ultimately, although the President must have the power 
to remove executive officers who fail to faithfully execute the law, the 
Supreme Court upheld for-cause removal restrictions in a series of cases, 
allowing Congress to create independent agencies. 
In Myers v. United States, the Court struck down a statutory 
provision conditioning removal of first-class postmasters on “the advice 
and consent of the Senate.”45  The Court held that the Constitution 
required the President to have “unrestricted power . . . to remove [their] 
 
in the administrative context.”); Michele Estrin Gilman, The President As Scientist-in-Chief, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565, 601 (2009) (“Of course, Congress competes with the President to control 
agencies. . . .  Particularly if the President is directing agency outcomes, [they] can diminish the 
impact of congressional oversight because the threat of removal can be more powerful than that of 
the purse.”).   
 38. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 34, at 3. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). 
 40. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 109 (1926). 
 41. Id. at 109–10. 
 42. See id. at 163–64 (“Article II grants to the President the executive power of the 
Government . . . including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers.”); see also 
Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (explaining 
that the Court has recognized since 1789 that “the executive power include[s] a power to oversee 
executive officers through removal”).  
 43. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018) (CFPB); 42 U.S.C. § 1975(e) (2012) (Commission on 
Civil Rights) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (2018) (Consumer Product Safety Commission); 12 
U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2) (FHFA) (2018); 5 U.S.C. § 7104(b) (2018) (Federal Labor Relations Authority); 
46 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (2012) (Federal Maritime Commission); 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2018) (Federal 
Reserve); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018) (FTC); 30 U.S.C. § 823(b)(1) (2012) (Mine Safety and Heath 
Review Commission); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)); 45 
U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (National Mediation Board); 49 U.S.C. § 1111(c) (2012) (National 
Transportation Safety Board); 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (2012) (Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission); 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2018) (Office of Special Counsel); 39 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012) 
(Postal Regulatory Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (2012) (Social Security Administration); 39 
U.S.C. § 202(a)(1) (2012) (United States Postal Service).  
 44. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). 
 45. 272 U.S. at 176–77. 
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appointees,” flowing from the “general grant . . . of the executive power” 
and the “constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully 
executed.”46  Although Chief Justice Taft’s Myers opinion contained 
broad language suggesting complete presidential removal power,47 the 
Court subsequently cabined Myers’s apparent reach.48  In Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, the Court unanimously upheld a statutory 
limitation on the President’s power to remove members of the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC).49  The Court distinguished Myers on the 
ground that a postmaster is a purely executive officer, whereas the FTC 
is a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial administrative agency, 
“occup[ying] no place in the executive department.”50  Congress’s 
authority to insulate quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies from 
executive control, the Court added, “cannot well be doubted.”51  In 
upholding the for-cause removal protection as a permissible means of 
ensuring that FTC Commissioners “maintain an attitude of 
independence” from the President’s control,52 the Court made clear that 
Myers did no more than establish the principle that the President must be 
able remove at will subordinate officers in the executive branch.53 
In Bowsher v. Synar, the Court invalidated statutory provisions 
delegating executive power to the Comptroller General, a legislative 
officer removable only by joint resolution of Congress for cause.54  
Relying on Myers, the Court concluded broadly that “Congress cannot 
reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the 
 
 46. Id. at 134–35. 
 47. See id. at 163–64.  The Court’s decision relied primarily on a strong unitary executive 
interpretation of the so-called decision of 1789.  See id. at 163.  The Court emphasized that for 
seventy-four years after the decision of 1789, “no act of Congress, no executive act, and no decision 
of this court [was] at variance with the declaration of the First Congress,” but, interestingly, 
downplayed the fact that a number of Presidents had approved legislation restricting their own 
removal power.  Id. at 163, 170. 
 48. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352 (1958) (“Within less than ten years a 
unanimous Court, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, narrowly confined the scope of the 
Myers decision to include only ‘all purely executive officers.’” (citation omitted) (quoting 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935)).  Myers is generally regarded as the 
“high-water mark of the unitary executive theory.”  Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing 
Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2551 (2011).  
 49. 295 U.S. 602, 619, 631–32 (1935).  Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, the President 
may remove a Commissioner only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”  15 
U.S.C. § 41 (2018).  
 50. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628. 
 51. Id. at 629.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 627–28. 
 54. 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986). 
672 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
execution of the laws except by impeachment.”55  Two years later, the 
Court in Morrison v. Olson upheld the constitutionality of an 
independent counsel position established in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal to investigate wrongdoing in the executive branch, removable 
only for cause by the Attorney General.56  Although the independent 
counsel performed “quintessentially executive” functions,57 the Court 
made clear that the official’s functions were not dispositive.  The “real 
question” for the Court was whether the inability to remove an officer at 
will interfered with the President’s ability to perform their Article II duty 
to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.58  While the independent 
counsel exercised significant discretion and independent judgment, the 
officer was an inferior officer who possessed only “limited jurisdiction” 
and “lack[ed] policymaking or significant administrative authority.”59  
The Court therefore could “not see how the President’s need to control 
the exercise of that discretion [was] so central to the functioning of the 
Executive Branch as to require . . . that the counsel be terminable at will 
by the President.”60 
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, the Court’s most recent removal-
power decision, purported to apply Morrison’s functional inquiry to 
invalidate two layers of for-cause removal protection.61  Free Enterprise 
Fund involved the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,62 which allowed 
members of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
remove members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) only for cause.63  The SEC Commissioners, in turn, could only 
be removed by the President for cause.64  The Court held that these two 
 
 55. Id. at 726 (“To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only 
to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws.”).  
As a remedy, the Court chose to strip the Comptroller of executive power, rather than perform 
“creative and imaginative statutory surgery” and sever the removal provisions.  Id. at 736. 
 56. 487 U.S. 654, 696–97 (1988). 
 57. Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The independent counsel] is vested with the ‘full power 
and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the 
Department of Justice [and] the Attorney General.’ . . .  Governmental investigation and prosecution 
of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” (citations omitted)). 
 58. Id. at 691 (majority opinion). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 691–92.  
 61. 561 U.S. 477, 483–84 (2010).  
 62. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code). 
 63. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 495. 
 64. Id. at 487.  The President could only remove SEC Commissioners for “inefficiency, neglect 
of duty, or malfeasance in office.”  Id. (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 
620 (1935)).  
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layers of for-cause removal protection—a “Matryoshka doll of tenure 
protections”—unduly diluted the President’s control over the executive 
branch.65  As a remedy, the Court severed the PCAOB’s for-cause 
removal provision, but left intact the SEC Commissioners’ for-cause 
removal protection.66  In PHH,67 a D.C. Circuit panel stretched the 
Court’s approach in Free Enterprise Fund to invalidate the CFPB’s 
structure.68 
B. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, ignited by the collapse 
of mortgage-backed securities,69 Congress established the CFPB under 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
201070 to enforce federal consumer financial laws consistently and 
protect consumers from financial abuse.71  To accomplish these goals, 
Congress gave the CFPB extensive rulemaking,72 supervisory,73 and 
enforcement74 powers, including the authority to issue cease-and-desist 
orders after a formal adjudication proceeding.75  To ensure independence, 
Dodd-Frank places the CFPB outside the annual appropriations process 
and in the Federal Reserve System, an independent bureau.76  Dodd-
Frank also provides for a single director to lead the agency.77  The CFPB 
 
 65. Id. at 497, 514. 
 66. Id. at 508–09 (“Concluding that the removal restrictions are invalid leaves the Board 
removable by the Commission at will, and leaves the President separated from Board members by 
only a single level of good-cause tenure.  The Commission is then fully responsible for the Board’s 
actions, which are no less subject than the Commission’s own functions to Presidential oversight.”).  
 67. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (PHH I), 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en 
banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 68. See infra Section II.A. 
 69. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 14 (2010).  For a thorough account of the anatomy of the 2008 
financial crisis, see Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Anatomy of the Mortgage 
Securitization Crisis, in 30A MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: PART A 29–70 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010).  
 70. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). 
 71. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)–(b) (2018).  The CFPB consolidated consumer financial protection 
authorities that previously existed across seven federal agencies under one roof to ensure 
government accountability.  See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11.  
 72. See 12 U.S.C. § 5512. 
 73. See id. §§ 5514–5515. 
 74. See id. §§ 5561–5567. 
 75. Id. § 5563(b). 
 76. Id. § 5491(a).  Each year, the CFPB Director may request a “reasonably necessary” funding 
amount from the Federal Reserve, up to a statutory funding cap.  Id. § 5497(a).  The Federal 
Reserve, the President, and Congress have no influence.  See id. 
 77. Id. § 5491(b). 
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Director, appointed by the President with Senate consent, serves a five-
year term, during which they may not be removed by the President 
without cause.78 
The D.C. Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the CFPB’s 
structure in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.79  The 
case arose out of a mortgage lender’s alleged violations of the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), which prohibits 
mortgage kickbacks in exchange for referrals.80  In 2014, the CFPB filed 
a Notice of Charges against PHH Corporation, PHH Mortgage 
Corporation, PHH Home Loans, LLC, Atrium Insurance Corporation, 
and Atrium Reinsurance Corporation (collectively, PHH), alleging 
RESPA violations.81  An administrative law judge (ALJ) first adjudicated 
the charges and found that PHH violated RESPA’s prohibition against 
kickbacks.82  The ALJ recommended a disgorgement of approximately 
$6.4 million in reinsurance premiums.83  On review, the CFPB Director 
upheld the ALJ’s RESPA violations finding but adopted a broader 
interpretation of RESPA, raising the disgorgement amount to over $109 
million.84  PHH appealed the CFPB Director’s decision on multiple 
grounds, including the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure.85 
In a hundred-page opinion penned by Judge Kavanaugh, a divided 
panel’s majority held that the CFPB Director’s protection from removal 
at will violates the Constitution’s separation of powers by vesting 
“substantial executive authority” in a single individual unaccountable to 
the President.86  Because the CFPB’s structure is not analogous to the 
dual-layer tenure structure of the PCAOB in Free Enterprise Fund, the 
 
 78. Id. § 5491(c) (“The President may remove the Director for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”).  
 79. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (PHH II), 881 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en 
banc).  
 80. PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 10–11 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  Specifically, RESPA provides that “[n]o 
person shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or thing of value pursuant to any 
agreement or understanding, oral or otherwise, that business incident to or a part of a real estate 
settlement service involving a federally related mortgage loan shall be referred to any person.”  § 
2607(a).  
 81. PHH II, 881 F.3d at 82.  The CFPB alleged that “[t]he premiums ceded by [mortgage 
insurers] to PHH through [its captive insurer]: (a) were not for services actually furnished or 
performed, or (b) grossly exceeded the value of any such services, and that the premiums were 
instead made in consideration of PHH’s continued referral of mortgage insurance business.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 82–83. 
 85. PHH I, 839 F.3d at 7.  
 86. Id. at 16, 36.  
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panel had to distinguish the CFPB’s structure from Humphrey’s Executor 
and Morrison to find it unconstitutional.  Judge Kavanaugh distinguished 
the cases on the ground that Dodd-Frank, in an allegedly unprecedented 
move, provided for a single individual to head an independent agency.87  
Judge Kavanaugh declared the Director of the CFPB “the single most 
powerful official in the entire United States Government [other than the 
President], at least when measured in terms of unilateral power.”88  Judge 
Kavanaugh reasoned that independent agencies are not accountable to 
the President, and that the multimember structure “acts as a critical 
substitute check” in lieu of presidential control.89  By concentrating 
“massive,” “enormous” power over “vast swaths of American economic 
and social life” in a single, unaccountable individual, that critical check 
is absent from the CFPB, posing “a far greater risk of arbitrary 
decisionmaking and abuse of power, and a far greater threat to individual 
liberty, than does a multi-member independent agency.”90  As a remedy, 
Judge Kavanaugh severed the for-cause removal provision from the 
CFPB’s enabling act.91 
After an en banc rehearing, the D.C. Circuit vacated the panel 
decision and upheld the constitutionality of the CFPB’s structure.92  The 
7–3 majority found nothing about the CFPB that stood out to “give [it] 
pause” that the agency’s structure is unconstitutional.93  In evaluating 
whether the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection 
unconstitutionally interferes with the President’s Article II duty, the en 
banc majority noted that the removal protection at issue is “the verbatim 
protection” upheld in Humphrey’s Executor94 and that the autonomy of 
the CFPB Director, whose functions are not “core executive functions,” 
is “consistent with a longstanding tradition of independence for financial 
regulators.”95  Further, the court emphasized that neither the eight-
member majority or Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison suggested the 
 
 87. Id. at 6–7, 17 (stating that “no independent agency exercising substantial executive 
authority has ever [previously] been headed by a single person” and that the CFPB is “a historical 
anomaly”). 
 88. Id. at 16. 
 89. Id. at 8. 
 90. Id. at 8, 15. 
 91. Id. at 8. 
 92. PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“The CFPB led by a single Director is 
as consistent with the President’s constitutional authority as it would be if it were led by a group.”).  
 93. Id. at 93. 
 94. Id.  Just as the statutory provision at issue in Humphrey’s Executor provides, the President 
may remove the CFPB Director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”  
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018) (FTC), with 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018) (CFPB).  
 95. PHH II, 881 F.3d at 84, 93. 
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fact that the independent counsel was a “solo actor” was material to the 
analysis.96  The en banc majority concluded that any intellectually 
consistent reading of the Court’s removal-power precedent—particularly 
Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor—required finding the CFPB’s 
leadership structure constitutional.97  The en banc majority’s analysis 
follows the existing Supreme Court case law. 
The en banc majority also rejected PHH’s “untenable” distinction 
between an independent agency headed by a single individual and one 
headed by a multimember body vis-à-vis presidential removal power,98 
describing PHH’s position as a “wholesale attack on independent 
agencies . . . that, if accepted, would broadly transform modern 
government.”99  In his concurrence, Circuit Judge Tatel added that “PHH 
is free to ask the Supreme Court to revisit Humphrey’s Executor and 
Morrison, but that argument has no truck in a circuit court of appeals.”100  
The en banc majority thus upheld the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal 
protection.101  Judge Kavanaugh dissented from the en banc decision 
overruling his panel opinion.102  Judge Kavanaugh’s reasoning in his 
dissent, which closely tracked his PHH panel opinion, was heavily relied 
upon by the Fifth Circuit in assessing the constitutionality of the FHFA’s 
single-director structure.103 
C. Collins v. Mnuchin 
Three years before establishing the CFPB, Congress enacted the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) to help stabilize 
the unraveling housing market.104  HERA sought to increase 
governmental control over two government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs),105 the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and 
 
 96. Id. at 96. 
 97. Id. at 93.  The CFPB’s budgetary independence did not affect this analysis.  Id. at 96.  
 98. Id. at 79–80, 96 (“[T]his line of attack finds no home in constitutional law.”). 
 99. Id. at 80; see also Opening En Banc Brief for Petitioners at 22 n.4, PHH II, 881 F.3d 75 
(No. 15-1177) (preserving argument for overruling Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor). 
 100. PHH II, 881 F.3d. at 113 (Tatel, J., concurring). 
 101. Id. at 110.  
 102. Id. at 164–200 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 103. See Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 659–72 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en 
banc, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019).  
 104. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4642 
(2018)). 
 105. A government-sponsored enterprise is “a privately owned, federally-chartered financial 
institution with nationwide scope and specialized lending powers that benefits from an implicit 
federal guarantee.”  THOMAS H. STANTON, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES: 
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the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), together 
the dominant players in the mortgage-backed securities market.106  
HERA created the FHFA to oversee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and 
empowered it to act as both regulator and conservator of the GSEs.107  
Congress determined that the FHFA, like the CFPB, needed 
independence to insulate the agency from the political pressure that 
plagued past regulators, and placed the agency outside the normal 
appropriations process.108  To lead the agency, Congress provided for a 
single director, appointed for a five-year term, removable by the 
President only for cause.109 
In Collins v. Mnuchin, a split three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit 
held that the FHFA’s structure violates the Constitution’s separation of 
powers.110  Rather than create a circuit split, the court sought to 
distinguish PHH based on “salient distinctions” between the FHFA and 
CFPB.111  But the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning and repeated citations to 
Judge Kavanaugh’s PHH dissenting opinion suggest it was more 
sympathetic to Judge Kavanaugh’s views than those of the majority.  
Nevertheless, the court’s analysis began with the premise that “agencies 
may be independent,” but they may not be so insulated as to become 
effectively “isolated.”112  The court recognized the difficulty in 
measuring insulation, but insisted that it must “remain faithful” to Free 
Enterprise Fund.113  The court argued that Free Enterprise Fund requires 
a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether a for-cause removal 
provision “working together” with other statutory provisions excessively 
 
MERCANTILIST COMPANIES IN THE MODERN WORLD 1–2 (2002). 
 106. 12 U.S.C. § 4501(2) (2018) (“[B]ecause the continued ability of the Federal National 
Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to accomplish their public 
missions is important to providing housing in the United States and the health of the Nation’s 
economy, more effective Federal regulation is needed to reduce the risk of failure of the 
enterprises.”).  
 107. Id. §§ 4511, 4617.  Conservatorship is “a statutory process designed to stabilize a troubled 
institution with the objective of returning [it] to normal business operations.”  Press Release, Fed. 
Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B. Lockhart at News Conference 




 108. See 12 U.S.C. § 4516 (2018). 
 109. Id. § 4512(b).   
 110. 896 F.3d 640, 646 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 938 F.3d 553 (5th 
Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019). 
 111. See id. at 673.  
 112. Id. at 662. 
 113. Id. at 666 n.196 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 509 (2010)).  
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insulate an agency, “produc[ing] a constitutional violation.”114 
The Fifth Circuit found the FHFA “too insulated” from executive 
oversight.115  In reaching its decision, the court assessed the cumulative 
effect of five insulating mechanisms: “(1) for-cause removal restriction; 
(2) single-director leadership structure; (3) lack of a bipartisan leadership 
composition requirement; (4) funding stream outside the normal 
appropriations process; and (5) Federal Housing Finance Oversight 
Board’s purely advisory oversight role.”116  Whatever the merits of the 
court’s argument that these elements are insulation mechanisms, the first 
four present in the FHFA were also present in the CFPB.117  The only 
true distinguishing factor between the FHFA and the CFPB is that “the 
Executive Branch can directly control the CFPB’s actions” via the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council.118  The FSOC holds veto-power 
over the CFPB, allowing the FSOC to set aside CFPB regulations that 
put the “safety and soundness” of the U.S. banking system or financial 
system at risk.119  In contrast, the FHOFB “exercises purely advisory 
functions,” as it “cannot require the FHFA or Director to do anything” 
other than order a board meeting.120  The court concluded that Congress 
“encased the FHFA in so many layers of insulation,” creating an agency 
unaccountable to the President in violation of Article II.121  The court’s 
solution was to sever the removal restriction from HERA, “restoring 
Executive Branch oversight to the FHFA.”122 
The Fifth Circuit subsequently agreed to hear the case en banc.123  
The en banc court reinstated the portion of the panel decision finding the 
FHFA’s structure unconstitutional.124  In so doing, the en banc court 
sought to clarify yet again that the panel opinion “distinguishes the D.C. 
 
 114. Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509).  
 115. Id. at 661, 666. 
 116. Id. at 666–70. 
 117. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 118. Collins, 896 F.3d at 673. 
 119. 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a) (2018).  
 120. Collins, 896 F.3d at 669. 
 121. Id. at 674 (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 
(2010)).  
 122. Id. at 676.  Recognizing that the removal restriction was “just one of several provisions” 
that, when combined, violated the separation of powers, the court refused to make any other edits to 
HERA because “such editorial freedom . . . belongs to the Legislature, not to the Judiciary.”  Id. 
(quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 510).  
 123. See Collins v. Mnuchin, 908 F.3d 151 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 124. See Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 587–88 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019). 
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Circuit’s PHH Corp. decision.”125  But this distinction is untenable.126  
Collins v. Mnuchin creates a circuit split on the issue of the 
constitutionality of the single-head structure. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Collectively, the Supreme Court’s removal-power cases involve two 
distinct issues raised by statutory limits on the President’s removal 
power.  The first issue concerns the means of independence.  The 
President’s Article II duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed is clear and specific: any provision that prevents the President 
from removing an “unfaithful” officer—that is, an officer that fails to 
faithfully execute the law—is per se invalid.127  Because provisions that 
condition removal on Senate consent or a joint resolution of Congress 
may prevent the President from removing an unfaithful officer, such 
requirements are invalid.128  In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court extended 
this principle to invalidate two layers of for-cause removal protection.129  
In contrast, the Court has repeatedly held that a single layer of for-cause 
removal protection does not violate the Take Care Clause because the 
protection does not prevent the removal of an unfaithful officer.130 
The second issue concerns the validity of policy independence.  For-
cause removal protection gives an officer policy independence because 
her failure—or refusal—to act in accordance with the President’s policy 
preferences does not constitute a failure to faithfully execute the laws.131  
In other words, the President does not have good cause for removal 
merely because an officer does not to align with their policy preferences.  
Nonetheless, this sort of policy independence arguably violates the 
unitary executive theory implicit in Article II’s Vesting Clause.  
 
 125. Id. at 588. 
 126. See infra notes 203–13 and accompanying text.  
 127. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) 
(“The President cannot ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ if [they] cannot oversee the 
faithfulness of the officers who execute them.”); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (“To 
permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in 
practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws. . . .  The structure of the 
Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws.”). 
 128. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122–24 (1926); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726. 
 129. 561 U.S. at 484.  
 130. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630–32 (1935); Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988). 
 131. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 18 (2d ed. 1960) (characterizing 
unfettered removal power as the “gun behind the door” that allows the President to “bend” agency 
heads “to [their] will”). 
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Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison resolved the policy-independence 
concern by using an “essential” or “core functions” test, which asks if 
policy independence interferes with the President’s control over the 
“essential” or “core functions” of the executive branch.132  In assessing 
the validity of for-cause removal provisions, Humphrey’s Executor and 
Morrison emphasize (1) the nature of the agency functions as either 
“core executive” functions, such as those entrusted to a secretary of state 
or other cabinet officer, or “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial 
functions,”133 and (2) the scope of policy discretion and authority the 
independent agency wields.134  The Court repeatedly holds that where “a 
degree of independence from the Executive . . . is necessary to the proper 
functioning of the agency or official,” a single layer of for-cause removal 
protection does not impermissibly interfere with the President’s Article II 
constitutional role.135  A single layer of for-cause removal protection is 
therefore valid, unless the resulting independence of those officers 
interferes with the President’s essential functions.136 
Under this conventional analysis, courts assess the constitutionality 
of a for-cause removal provision for a single agency head in the same 
way––by focusing on the nature of the officer’s functions and the scope 
of her policy discretion and authority.  Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to 
the removal power, however, departs dramatically from the conventional 
analysis. 
A. Judge Kavanaugh’s (Unprecedented) Approach to the Removal 
Power 
Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal power in PHH is 
entirely novel.  First, Supreme Court precedent makes clear that a single-
layer of protection from removal at will does not violate the Take Care 
Clause because the President has the power to remove officers for good 
cause—a power the Court “ha[s] already concluded provides the 
Executive with substantial ability to ensure that the laws are ‘faithfully 
executed.’”137  In this respect, Free Enterprise Fund is not directly 
 
 132. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–30; Morrison, 487 U.S. 669, 690–91. 
 133. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624, 629; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688–89.   
 134. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92.  
 135. Id. at 691 n.30, 686–96; see also Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958); 
Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631–32. 
 136. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 630; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 669; see also GLICKSMAN & 
LEVY, supra note 29, at 85 (“Congress may limit the President’s removal power to specified causes, 
provided that this limitation does not interfere with the essential functions of the President.”). 
 137. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696; see also Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 632. 
2020] THE SINGLE-HEADED FOURTH BRANCH 681 
relevant to PHH (or Collins).  Free Enterprise Fund is not about 
excessive insulation in general, but about a specific prohibition against 
interference with the duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed.138  That analysis, however, is not relevant to the essential 
functions consideration.  In fact, Free Enterprise Fund says nothing 
about the proper analysis for a single layer of for-cause removal 
protection.  There, the Court left intact the SEC Commissioners’ ordinary 
for-cause protection––the very protection that insulates the FTC, the 
CFPB, and other independent agencies—even as it severed the second 
layer.139  As Judge Kavanaugh himself recognizes, “it is black-letter law 
that cases are not precedent for issues that were not raised or decided.”140   
Second, the essential functions consideration is concerned with 
whether an agency’s independence interferes with the President’s 
essential or core executive functions, not with how much unaccountable 
power an agency exercises.141  The PHH en banc majority applied the 
conventional doctrine, under which the CFPB’s single-head structure 
comports with the Take Care Clause because the President may remove 
the CFPB Director, who does not exercise core executive functions, for 
good cause: 
 Our analysis focuses on whether Congress’s choice to include a for-
cause removal provision impedes the President’s ability to fulfill his 
constitutional role.  Two principal considerations inform our conclusion 
that it does not.  First, the familiar for-cause protection at issue broadly 
allows the President to remove the Director for “inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance in office,” leaving the President ample tools to 
ensure the faithful execution of the laws.  Second, the functions of the 
CFPB and its Director are not core executive functions . . . .  Rather, 
the CFPB is one of a number of federal financial regulators . . . that 
have long been permissibly afforded a degree of independence.  The 
CFPB matches what the Supreme Court’s removal-power cases have 
consistently approved.142 
 
 138. For instance, in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, the extensive control that the SEC 
exercised over the PCAOB’s actions could not salvage the dual-layered removal limitation, unless 
that control was virtually absolute, so as to make every unfaithful PCAOB action attributable to the 
SEC itself.  561 U.S. 477, 509–10 (2010).  
 139. Id. at 509 (“Concluding that the removal restrictions are invalid leaves the Board removable 
by the Commission at will, and leaves the President separated from Board members by only a single 
level of good-cause tenure.  The Commission is then fully responsible for the Board’s actions, which 
are no less subject than the Commission’s own functions to Presidential oversight.”). 
 140. PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing 
BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 46, 84, 226–28 (2016)).  
 141. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 630; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 669. 
 142. See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 84 (emphasis added). 
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In this respect, Judge Kavanaugh’s claim that the CFPB Director is not 
accountable is misleading at best.  To the extent that Judge Kavanaugh’s 
argument relates to other means of presidential control––such as 
multimember bodies, the appointment of a chair, etc.––the discussion 
could fit into the essential functions consideration, because other means 
of presidential control diminish the policy independence of the agency.  
Nothing in the removal-power doctrine suggests that Judge Kavanaugh’s 
considerations are relevant.  This does not necessarily mean he was 
wrong.  But it does mean that his approach is novel and unprecedented.  
Nonetheless, Judge Kavanaugh in PHH failed to explain this connection 
or justify adding these considerations to the factors identified by prior 
Supreme Court removal-power cases.  Relying heavily on Judge 
Kavanaugh’s PHH dissent, the Fifth Circuit in Collins v. Mnuchin also 
offered no explanation or justification for this approach.143 
If Judge Kavanaugh’s approach garners majority support in Seila 
Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, what will it mean 
for the Supreme Court’s removal-power doctrine?  The applicability of 
Judge Kavanaugh’s approach might, as he alleges, be limited to 
independent agencies with a single-head structure,144 acting as a third 
constraint alongside the faithful execution of the laws test and the 
essential functions test for policy independence.  More likely, Judge 
Kavanaugh’s approach would replace the essential functions test for 
agency independence altogether, in which case his approach would 
become applicable to all independent agencies, irrespective of their 
structure.  Judge Kavanaugh’s approach would allow reliance on cases 
involving independent agencies with a single-head structure to invalidate 
the constitutionality of all independent agencies down the road.145 
B. Finding a Home for Judge Kavanaugh’s Approach to the Removal 
Power: Protecting Liberty Is Not a Judicially Manageable Standard 
For Judge Kavanaugh, a separation of powers analysis in the context 
of the modern administrative state is about “executive power and 
 
 143. See generally Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 659–72 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part en banc, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 
2019). 
 144. See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 164–200 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the single-
head design from the multimember design, and noting that “Congress of course remains free, if it 
wishes, to reconstruct the CFPB as a traditional multi-member independent agency”).  
 145. See id. at 80 (majority opinion) (warning that Judge Kavanaugh’s approach is a “wholesale 
attack on independent agencies—whether collectively or individually led—that, if accepted, would 
broadly transform modern government”).  
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individual liberty.”146  In both his PHH and Free Enterprise Fund 
dissenting opinions, Judge Kavanaugh reminded the D.C. Circuit that the 
purpose of the Constitution’s separation of powers is to protect 
individual liberty.147  To protect individual liberty, Judge Kavanaugh 
explained, “the Framers . . . separated the legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers of the new national government.”148  However, Judge 
Kavanaugh’s assertion that only independent agencies headed by a 
multimember body may be insulated from at-will removal rests largely 
on ad hoc judgments about whether a specific institutional design 
sufficiently protects “individual liberty.”149  In particular, Judge 
Kavanaugh argued that independent agencies headed by single 
individuals threaten individual liberty because they present a greater risk 
of “arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power” than agencies headed 
by multimember bodies, which, in his view, effectively “divide and 
disperse power.”150  Judge Kavanaugh treats safeguarding liberty, a 
broad purpose of the separation of powers, as itself a judicially 
manageable standard.151  But as Professor John Manning explained: 
[T]he purposes of the separation of powers are too general and diverse 
to offer much concrete guidance.  Among other things, the separation 
of powers and the accompanying checks and balances promote 
efficiency, energy, stability, limited government, control of factions, 
deliberation, the rule of law, and accountability. . . .  [I]n the absence of 
any specific textual home or pattern of historical practice or judicial 
precedent, one could reasonably move from these broad and often-
conflicting purposes to any number of fair conclusions about . . . almost 
any freestanding separation of powers question.152 
 
 146. Id. at 164 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 147. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Our constitutional structure is premised . . . on the notion that . . . 
unaccountable power is inconsistent with individual liberty.”); PHH II, 881 F.3d at 183 (Kavanaugh, 
J., dissenting) (“The historical practice of structuring independent agencies as multi-member 
commissions or boards is the historical practice for a reason: It reflects a deep and abiding concern 
for safeguarding the individual liberty protected by the Constitution.”). 
 148. PHH II, 881 F.3d at 164 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 105 (majority opinion).  
 150. Id. at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).   
 151. Id. at 105 (majority opinion) (“Broad observations about liberty-enhancing effects are not 
themselves freestanding constitutional limitations.”).  
 152. John F. Manning, The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 56–57 (2014) 
(“Hence, Justice Brandeis could fairly write that the purpose of the separation of powers was ‘not to 
avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the 
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.’  Justice Jackson, 
however, could also write, with no less accuracy, that ‘[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the 
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a 
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If we are to take seriously Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the 
removal power as a possible constitutional standard, then, it must offer 
more than a reliance on, as Justice Scalia would put it, “ad hoc, 
standardless judgment[s]”153 about individual liberty.  Further, Judge 
Kavanaugh’s analysis in PHH leaned heavily on historical precedent (or, 
rather, a lack thereof) as a basis for invalidating the CFPB’s design.154  
But novelty is not itself a constitutional standard.  Historical practice 
might validate an otherwise questionable practice,155 but “mere anomaly 
or innovation” does not offend the Court’s constitutional separation-of-
power principles.156  
Under Judge Kavanaugh’s approach, instead of asking “how much 
removal of Presidential power is too much,”157 courts must instead ask, 
how much unconstrained agency power is too much?  Agency 
independence is traditionally viewed relative to the executive, but there 
is a broad set of indicia of independence.158  This Comment articulates a 
framework for Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal power that 
determines the constitutionality of an agency’s unaccountable power in 
light of (1) the nature and scope of an agency’s powers, and (2) the 
structural restraints imposed on the exercise of those powers.  Judge 
Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal power, if adopted by the Supreme 
Court, would raise serious doubts about the constitutionality of 
independent agencies, most significantly the SSA.  This Comment 
concludes that Judge Kavanaugh’s approach would invalidate the SSA’s 
structure after assessing the cumulative effect of the SSA’s structural 
features, including: (1) the nature and scope of power congressionally 
conferred upon the SSA; (2) the lack of indirect political safeguards; and 
(3) the lack of external political control.  In short, this Comment argues 
that if Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal power invalidates the 
 
workable government.’” (first quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); and then quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring))). 
 153. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711–12 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s holding as, among other things, not providing a clear judicially manageable standard on 
“how much removal of Presidential power is too much”).  
 154. See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 188 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about the 
“novel[ty]” of the CFPB’s novel single-director structure).  
 155. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (explaining that the “challenge 
must be sought in historical understanding and practice” because there is no constitutional text 
directly on point for the specific question asked in this case).  
 156. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989) (addressing the constitutionality of the 
Sentencing Commission’s composition). 
 157. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 158. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 13, at 773. 
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structure of the CFPB, then it necessarily invalidates the structure of the 
SSA as well. 
C. Judge Kavanaugh’s Approach to the Removal Power Invalidates the 
Social Security Administration’s Structure 
Congress adopted the Social Security Act of 1935 in the throes of the 
Great Depression to provide retirement security for American workers as 
part of the New Deal.159  The SSA is an independent agency responsible 
for administering Social Security, a social insurance program that 
provides old age, survivorship, and disability benefits to individuals that 
qualify by virtue of contributions through the Social Security tax on their 
earnings or on the basis of need.160  In particular, the SSA runs two 
principal benefits programs: Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance Benefits (OASDI),161 an insurance program, and the need-
based Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, and Disabled 
(SSI).162  The SSA started out as an independent agency called the Social 
Security Board, transitioned to a sub-cabinet agency in 1939, and was 
subsequently restored to its original status as an independent agency in 
1995 by the SSA Independence and Program Improvements Act of 
1994.163  Like the CFPB and the FHFA, the SSA is headed by a single 
individual, the Commissioner, rather than a multimember body.164  The 
Commissioner serves a six-year term, during which they may be 
removed by the President only for cause.165 
1. Nature and Scope of Power Congressionally Conferred 
Under Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal power, the nature 
and scope of power congressionally conferred upon an independent 
 
 159. For a historical background of the SSA, see Historical Background and Development of 
Social Security, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html [https://perma.cc/ 
A5DZ-Z4XM] (last visited Jan. 18, 2020).  
 160. See SSA Organizational Manual: Chapter S – Social Security Administration, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/org/orgOC.htm [https://perma.cc/TR79-U53H] (last visited Jan. 18, 
2020).  
 161. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434 (2012). 
 162. See id. §§ 1381–1383f. 
 163. Social Security History: Organizational History, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ 
history/orghist.html [https://perma.cc/EHE6-QCAX] (last visited Jan. 18, 2020); Historical 
Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 159.  
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a) (2012).   
 165. Id.  The Commissioner “may be removed from office only pursuant to a finding by the 
President of neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”  Id. § 902(a)(3). 
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agency is an important consideration.  Courts must examine an agency’s 
structural features collectively to determine the constitutionality of its 
independence.  In Morrison, for instance, the Court found fewer 
protections for a special independent counsel necessary because the 
nature and scope of the independent counsel’s delegated power was 
narrow and did not include policymaking or significant administrative 
authority.166 
In PHH, Judge Kavanaugh argued that the CFPB could not rely upon 
the SSA as precedent for its structure.167  In distinguishing the SSA from 
the CFPB, Judge Kavanaugh characterized the nature and scope of power 
wielded by the SSA as less “core” to Article II than those 
congressionally conferred upon the CFPB.168  Judge Kavanaugh argued 
the SSA Commissioner “does not possess unilateral authority to bring 
law enforcement actions against private citizens, which is the core of the 
executive power.”169  The SSA lacks authority to impose fines or 
penalties on individuals in Social Security benefits cases.170  The SSA’s 
authority primarily involves processing claims for benefits and 
adjudicating eligibility.171  While the Commissioner does have limited 
power to initiate a proceeding to determine whether to impose civil 
sanctions against individuals who file improper claims, they may do so 
“only as authorized by the Attorney General,” an executive officer 
directly accountable to the President.172 
Judge Kavanaugh’s effort to distinguish away the SSA on the basis 
that its Commissioner does not exercise core executive functions is 
unpersuasive.  Judge Kavanaugh is correct insofar as he notes that the 
SSA does not exercise core executive functions.  But neither does the 
CFPB.  The CFPB is no more “an arm or an eye of the executive,” than 
the FTC was in Humphrey’s Executor.173  In this respect, the CFPB’s role 
is materially indistinguishable from the FTC’s role, which involves 
“filling in and administering the details embodied by th[e] general 
standard[s]” provided in a statute regulating financial transactions.174  
Some of the CFPB’s functions may “to some degree” be executive in 
 
 166. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988). 
 167. PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 174–75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 174 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 170. Id. at 175. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2015)).  
 173. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).   
 174. Id. 
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nature,175 but they are not “core executive functions.”176  As the en banc 
PHH majority put it, “the CFPB is one of a number of federal financial 
regulators . . . that have long been permissibly afforded a degree of 
independence.”177  Because neither the CFPB nor the SSA exercise core 
executive functions, this is not a factor that distinguishes the two 
independent agencies. 
Further, the scope of the SSA’s power is massive.  The SSA runs two 
of the federal government’s largest benefit programs, OASDI178 and 
SSI,179 handling millions of benefits claims every year.  According to the 
SSA, over sixty-four million Americans received Social Security benefits 
in 2019.180  A report from the AARP Public Policy Institute found that 
Social Security benefits support over nine million jobs and add about 
$1.4 trillion in output to the American economy.181  It is difficult to see 
how any objective comparison of the SSA and the CFPB could find the 
latter’s power more significant.  The SSA not only controls entitlements 
for millions of Americans but the agency’s administration of these 
benefits also shapes long-term planning for the majority of the country.  
The SSA’s decisions have a great, consequential reach.182  In contrast, 
the CFPB carries out enforcement duties related only to the offering of 
consumer financial products or services under federal consumer financial 
laws,183 directly affecting only corporate “liberties.”184 
 
 
 175. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 n.28 (1988). 
 176. PHH II, 881 F.3d at 84. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434 (2012).  
 179. See id. §§ 1381–1383f.  
 180. Benefits in Current Payment Status, supra note 27.  
 181. GARY KOENIG & AL MYLES, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST., SOCIAL SECURITY’S IMPACT ON THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMY 19 (2013).  
 182. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2019 BUDGET OVERVIEW 1 (2019), 
https://www.ssa.gov/budget/FY19Files/2019BO.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5PD-HUX9] (“The Social 
Security Administration’s programs touch nearly every member of the public at critical junctures in 
their lives . . . .”). 
 183. See 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2019).  
 184. Justice Sotomayor made this very observation during oral argument for Seila Law LLC.  See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7 (U.S. 
argued Mar. 3, 2020) (Sotomayor, J.), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument 
_transcripts/2019/19-7_j4ek.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ML4-VHTQ] (“[T]he Social Security 
Administration [is] as powerful, if not more powerful, than [the CFPB], because the Social Security 
Administration affects virtually every American.  This agency is limited to the financial market.”). 
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2. Indirect Presidential Control 
The existence of internal structural mechanisms that constrain 
agency power and provide the President with indirect political control is 
another important criteria under Judge Kavanaugh’s approach.  Such 
internal structural mechanisms include: (1) a multimember structure; (2) 
partisan balance requirements; and (3) a superior body within the agency 
that has the ability to revise, reverse, or alter the decisions of the 
agency’s head. 
a. Multimember Structure 
The majority of agencies with statutory removal protection are 
already headed by multimember bodies.185  Under a Judge Kavanaugh 
removal-power analysis, the multimember structure is a critical indirect 
political safeguard to constrain independent agency power.  Ignoring that 
the longstanding justification for the multimember leadership structure is 
insulation from political pressure by the President,186 Judge Kavanaugh 
maintains that the multimember structure prevents the concentration of 
“all power” in a single, unaccountable individual.187  Because 
independent agencies with a multimember leadership structure do not 
concentrate “all power” in one person, the multimember structure 
“reduces the risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power.”188  
An independent agency exercising “substantial executive authority” 
therefore requires a multimember structure to “divide and disperse 
power.”189  Under Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal power, 
this is where the problem begins and ends for the SSA.  Like the CFPB 
and the FHFA, a single individual heads the SSA.190 
 
 185. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 13, at 793 (listing the CFPB, FHFA, Office of Special 
Counsel, and SSA as the only agencies that are headed by a single individual with statutory removal 
protection).  
 186. See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 153–55 (1941); 
MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 107 (1955) (“[I]t 
was anticipated that such a commission could formulate policy without too much regard for the 
policies of the administration in power.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 184, at 
30 (Kagan, J.) (“[I]f a President can get one person on the phone, that’s a lot easier than if he has to 
worry about seven people who are all doing their own thing. . . .  [Y]ou can point at [that one 
person].”). 
 187. PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also 
Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 667–68 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 938 
F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019).  
 188. PHH II, 881 F.3d at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
 189. Id. 
 190. See 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1), (4) (2012) (“There shall be in the Administration a 
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b. Partisan Balance Requirements 
For Judge Kavanaugh, a statutory bipartisan balance requirement is a 
critical check on independent agency power.  A statutory bipartisan 
balance requirement is only possible, of course, with a multimember 
design.191  Typically, independent agencies with a multimember structure 
require political balance, with no more than a bare majority of members 
from the same political party.192  In an era of extreme political 
polarization, independent agency members are particularly likely to align 
with the policy preferences of their respective political parties.193  A 
bipartisan leadership structure supplies “a built-in monitoring system” 
for partisan political interests by encouraging a dissent “if the agency 
goes too far in one direction.”194  That dissent can serve “as a ‘fire alarm’ 
that alerts Congress and the public at large that the agency’s decision 
might merit closer scrutiny.”195  From Judge Kavanaugh’s perspective, 
there is nobody at the SSA to ring the alarm. 
Like the FHFA and CFPB, the SSA lacks a bipartisan balance 
requirement.  Its single Commissioner is necessarily of a single party, the 
party of the appointing President.196  The SSA Commissioner serves a 
fixed six-year term, an even longer term than the directors of both the 
CFPB and FHFA.197  A SSA Commissioner from the President’s 
opposing party may therefore command the agency for the entirety of the 
President’s term. 
 
Commissioner of Social Security . . . .  The Commissioner shall be responsible for the exercise of all 
powers and the discharge of all duties of the [SSA], and shall have authority and control over all 
personnel and activities thereof.”).  
 191. PHH II, 881 F.3d at 185 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Collins, 896 F.3d at 668. 
 192. Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of 
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1138–39 (2000).  For instance, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation is governed by a five-member body, no more than three of which 
may be of the same political party.  12 U.S.C. § 1812(a) (2018).  Similarly, the Federal Trade 
Commission, composed of five members, may have no more than three members of the same 
political party.  15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018).  Not all multimember independent agencies are structured 
this way.  The NLRB and the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, for instance, do not require 
bipartisanship.  See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (NLRB); 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2018) (Federal Reserve). 
 193. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and 
the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 491–92 (2008) (noting that empirical studies 
of commissioner voting practices and the nomination process support this claim). 
 194. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 41 (2010) (citing Hugo Hopenhayn & Susanne Lohmann, Fire Alarm Signals and 
the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 196, 197–98 (1996)). 
 195. Id. (citations omitted).  
 196. See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 148 (Henderson, J., dissenting). 
 197. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (2012).  The CFPB and FHFA directors serve fixed five-year terms.  
12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(1) (2018) (CFPB); id. § 4512(b)(2) (FHFA).  
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c. Formal Oversight 
The extent to which a politically accountable body has statutory 
power to revise, reverse, or modify the decision of an agency head is 
another measure of internal political safeguard.  In Free Enterprise Fund, 
for instance, a problem with the dual-layer removal protections was that 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not give the SEC “effective power to start, 
stop, or alter individual [PCAOB] investigations, executive activities 
typically carried out by officials within the Executive Branch.”198  The 
PCAOB exercised “substantial executive authority,” including 
investigatory, enforcement, and policymaking functions, left 
unreviewable by a politically accountable body.199  In contrast, the Court 
in Morrison found the independent counsel at issue had “limited 
jurisdiction and tenure and lack[ed] policymaking or significant 
administrative authority.”200  The independent counsel’s role was limited 
to “investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution for certain federal 
crimes.”201  And that limited jurisdiction was subject to Department of 
 
 198. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 504 (2010).  Justice 
Breyer in dissent, however, argued that the SEC has “virtually absolute” control over the PCAOB’s 
investigative and legal functions.  Id. at 529 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer noted:  
• No Accounting Board rule takes effect unless and until the Commission 
approves it; The Commission may “abrogat[e], delet[e] or ad[d] to” any rule or 
any portion of a rule promulgated by the Accounting Board whenever, in the 
Commission’s view, doing so “further[s] the purposes” of the securities and 
accounting-oversight laws;  
• The Commission may review any sanction the Board imposes and “enhance, 
modify, cancel, reduce, or require the remission of” that sanction if it finds the 
Board’s action not “appropriate”;  
• The Commission may promulgate rules restricting or directing the Accounting 
Board’s conduct of all inspections and investigations;  
• The Commission may itself initiate any investigation or promulgate any rule 
within the Accounting Board’s purview, and may also remove any Accounting 
Board member who has unreasonably “failed to enforce compliance with” the 
relevant “rule[s], or any professional standard”;  
• The Commission may at any time “relieve the Board of any responsibility to 
enforce compliance with any provision” of the Act, the rules, or professional 
standards if, in the Commission’s view, doing so is in “the public interest.” 
Id. at 528–29 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (2018)).  
 199. Id. at 485, 505. 
 200. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988). 
 201. Id. at 671–72 (conceding that “the [Ethics and Government] Act delegates to appellant ‘full 
power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers 
of the Department of Justice,’” but emphasizing that this delegation “does not include any authority 
to formulate policy for the Government or the Executive Branch, nor does it give appellant any 
administrative duties outside of those necessary to operate her office” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) 
(2018))). 
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Justice regulations and policies, a politically accountable body.202 
In Collins v. Mnuchin, the Fifth Circuit placed significant weight on 
the absence of a statutory provision requiring formal executive control 
over the FHFA.203  Congress did establish the Federal Housing Finance 
Oversight Board (FHFOB), but as its title suggests, the FHFOB 
“exercises purely advisory functions.”204  Aside from requiring a special 
meeting of the FHFOB,205 the executive branch, through the FHFOB, 
“can do nothing more than cajole the FHFA into acting.”206  The Fifth 
Circuit compared the FHFA’s FHFOB to the CFPB’s FSOC.  The court 
argued that the FSOC allows the President to influence the CFPB’s 
actions through the appointment of a supermajority of FSOC members.207  
And in contrast to the FHFOB, the FSOC holds a “‘powerful’ oversight 
mechanism” over the CFPB because the FSOC may set aside CFPB 
regulations that put the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking or 
financial system at risk.208 
It remains unclear, however, how “powerful” the FSOC’s veto 
mechanism is and how much control the FSOC has over the CFPB in 
practice.209  The Fifth Circuit acknowledged this in a carefully-placed 
footnote, acknowledging that “whether the FSOC is a ‘meaningful 
substitute check’ on the CFPB’s actions” is an open question.210  The 
Fifth Circuit quoted a portion of Judge Henderson’s PHH dissent that 
described the FSOC’s veto power as so narrow that it is “a testament to 
 
 202. Id. at 662 (“[A]n independent counsel ‘shall, except where not possible, comply with the 
written or other established policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the 
criminal laws.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 594(f))).  
 203. 896 F.3d 640, 669–70 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 938 F.3d 553 (5th 
Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019). 
 204. Id. at 669; 12 U.S.C. § 4513a(a)–(b) (2018). 
 205. 12 U.S.C. § 4513a(d)(2) (2018). 
 206. Collins, 896 F.3d at 669. 
 207. Id. at 669–70 (quoting PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Wilkins, J., 
concurring)). 
 208. Id. at 670 (quoting PHH II, 881 F.3d at 120 (Wilkins, J., concurring)).  
 209. See Randall D. Guynn et al., Fifth Circuit Holds That FHFA Is Unconstitutionally 
Structured, DAVIS POLK: FINREG (July 18, 2018), https://www.finregreform.com/single-post/2018 
/07/18/fifth-circuit-holds-fhfa-unconstitutionally-structured/ [https://perma.cc/78E8-BYN5].  This 
discussion illustrates one of the ways in which Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal power is 
problematic.  As Justice Breyer explained in his Free Enterprise Fund dissent, “[c]ompared to 
Congress and the President, the Judiciary possesses an inferior understanding of the realities of 
administration, and the manner in which power, including and most especially political power, 
operates in context.”  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 523 
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 210. Collins, 896 F.3d at 670 n.233 (quoting PHH II, 881 F.3d at 159–60 (Henderson, J., 
dissenting)).  
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the CFPB’s unaccountable policymaking power.”211  Presumably in an 
attempt to minimize the fact that this distinction between the FHFA and 
the CFPB—the only real distinction the court identified212—is not much 
of a distinction after all, the Fifth Circuit closed by deflecting: “This 
magnifies the concern here: the FHFA lacks any oversight body.”213 
The FHFA is not the only independent agency headed by a single 
individual whose board is largely limited to providing advice.  The SSA 
established the Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB) to “advise the 
Commissioner on policies related to” Social Security benefits 
programs.214  Like the FHFOB, the SSAB does not possess veto power 
over the Commissioner’s decisions.215  Rather, the SSAB’s specific 
functions are mostly limited to “making recommendations” on matters 
related to the SSA’s duties.216  The SSA Commissioner is therefore not 
subject to the control of a politically accountable body within the agency 
with statutory power to revise, reverse, or modify the decisions of its 
Commissioner. 
3. External Political Control 
An independent agency’s power is also constrained by the President 
ability to maintain external political control over the agency through: (1) 
staggered appointments; (2) the ability to appoint and remove agency 
chairs at will; and (3) the agency’s funding structure. 
a. Staggered Appointments 
Members of independent agencies with a multimember structure 
typically serve staggered terms.217  Although holdover appointees will 
remain when administrations change, members of independent agencies 
often resign when a President of the opposing party takes office.218  
 
 211. Id. 
 212. See discussion supra notes 115–22 and accompanying text.  
 213. Collins, 896 F.3d at 670 n.233. 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 903(b) (2012).  
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018) (FTC, seven-year staggered terms); id. § 78d(a) (SEC, five-
year staggered terms); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012) (NLRB, five-year staggered terms). 
 218. See Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 197, 200 (1982) (“[C]ommission chair[persons] have tended to resign from their 
commissions (not simply from the chairmanship) upon losing presidential support, bolstering the 
President’s effective power of removal.”); see also Datla & Revesz, supra note 13, at 821 (noting as 
an example that “the Chairman of the SEC typically resigns both the chairmanship and the 
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According to Judge Kavanaugh, “Even apart from that tradition, the 
staggered terms mean that a President will have ever-increasing 
influence (through appointments) over an independent agency during the 
course of that President’s term.”219 
By virtue of its single-head design, the SSA, under Judge 
Kavanaugh’s approach, provides the President with “zero influence” 
over the agency through appointment—a “zero [that] remains zero” until 
the expiration of the Commissioner’s term.220  Judge Kavanaugh 
concedes that this reasoning might “be criticized as elementary 
arithmetical logic,” but nevertheless maintains that “some influence 
exceeds zero influence.”221  If the single-head design of the CFPB and 
the FHFA deprives the President from exerting political control to 
constrain the agency’s power under Kavanaugh’s approach, then so does 
the single-head design of the SSA. 
b. Ability to Appoint and Remove Agency Chairs at Will 
In addition to providing indirect political control, Judge Kavanaugh 
argues that the multimember structure increases presidential influence 
and oversight through the power to designate agency chairs and to 
remove chairs from their position as chair at will.222  The chair often has 
some authority over the agency’s budget and personnel decisions, sets 
the agency’s agenda, and is generally the agency’s “public voice.”223  
Because the President cannot remove chairs from their position as 
agency members, however, this power is limited.224  Notwithstanding this 
 
commission seat upon the election of a new President”).  But see Devins & Lewis, supra note 193, at 
497 (“[O]pposition-party commissioners serve out most, if not all, of their terms.”).  
 219. PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 220. Id. (evaluating the CFPB’s structure). 
 221. Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 501 
(2010)). 
 222. Id. at 166; see also Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 667 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part en banc, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 
25, 2019); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White 
House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 955 n.75 (1980) (noting the President appoints the chairs of the 
FTC, FCC, SEC, and NLRB); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of 
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 590–91 (1984) (arguing the President can 
influence the priorities and policy direction of independent agencies by designating a chair). 
 223. Datla & Revesz, supra note 13, at 819; see also Daniel E. Ho, Measuring Agency 
Preferences: Experts, Voting, and the Power of Chairs, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 337 (2010) 
(“[V]ote-based studies of regulatory behavior may fail to capture essential parts of agency behavior, 
namely, the agenda-setting power of agency chairs.”). 
 224. Ho, supra note 223, at 338 (discussing a study that demonstrates agency chairs typically 
resign when the President removes them from the chair position, providing the President with a new 
appointment (citing David C. Nixon & Thomas M. Grayson, Chairmen and the Independence of 
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limitation, Kirti Datla and Professor Richard Revesz argue that “[t]he 
ability of the President to retain policy influence through the selection of 
the chair is important because . . . the ‘chair of a [multimember] agency 
is ordinarily its most dominant figure,’” and “[a]n appointed chair will 
align with the President.”225  The ability to appoint a chair, while 
arguably limited in scope, gives the President some external control. 
Headed by a single individual, the SSA has no chair.  The inability to 
designate and remove at will chairs from the chair position was a 
significant factor to both Judge Kavanaugh in PHH and the Fifth Circuit 
Collins panel in finding the single-head structure unconstitutional.226  
Because of the single-head structure, a President “may be stuck for 
years” with an SSA Commissioner, a CFPB Director, or a FHFA 
Director appointed by a previous President who “vehemently opposes the 
current President’s agenda.”227  For Judge Kavanaugh, this “additional 
diminution of Presidential authority exacerbates the Article II 
problem.”228 
c. Agency Funding Sources 
Although largely overlooked,229 an agency’s funding structure 
implicates both the President and Congress’s political control.230  In 
 
Independent Regulatory Commissions 12 (Mar. 2003) (unpublished manuscript))). 
 225. Datla & Revesz, supra note 13, at 819 (quoting Breger & Edles, supra note 192, at 1164); 
see also Glen O. Robinson, Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 238, 245 n.24 (1988) (“From personal experience [as a former FCC Commissioner] 
I can report that the FCC’s chairman and a handful of staff—usually selected by the chair—can and 
usually do exercise nearly total control over that agency’s basic policy agenda.”). 
 226. See PHH II, 881 F.3d at 188 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The single-Director structure of 
the CFPB . . . diminishes the President’s power to exercise influence over the CFPB, as compared to 
the President’s power to exercise influence over traditional multi-member independent agencies.”); 
Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 667–68 (5th Cir. 2018) (“In multi-member agencies whose 
leaders are protected from at-will removal, the President can still influence the agency through the 
power ‘to designate the chairs of the agencies and to remove chairs at will from the chair position.’” 
(quoting PHH II, 881 F.3d at 166 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 
938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019). 
 227. PHH II, 881 F.3d at 167 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)  
 228. Id. at 188. 
 229. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 517 
(2000) (expressing “surpris[e]” that most regulatory reform proposals do not focus on agency 
financing).  Judge Kavanaugh’s PHH panel opinion largely neglected the CFPB’s funding structure 
as an indicium of independence, burying a brief mention of Congress’s power of the purse in a 
footnote: “The CFPB’s exemption from the ordinary appropriations process is at most just ‘extra 
icing on’ an unconstitutional ‘cake already frosted.’”  PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 36 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 557 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting)). 
 230. See HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43391, INDEPENDENCE OF 
FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATORS: STRUCTURE, FUNDING, AND OTHER ISSUES 3 (2017), 
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Professor Rachel Barkow’s words, to “locate power in Washington (and 
just about any place else), you must follow the money.”231  If an agency’s 
budget requests must be vetted and approved by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), the President has “significant input 
into the agency’s size, scope, and activities,” even if the agency head is 
removable only for cause.232  Likewise, if an agency’s budget is set 
through congressional authorization and appropriations, partisan political 
power can exert influence over the agency.233  Funding an agency outside 
of the appropriations process therefore further insulates the agency from 
partisan political influence.234  As Justice Breyer recognized, “who 
controls the agency’s budget requests and funding . . . affect[s] the 
President’s power to get something done.”235  An agency’s funding 
structure thus relates to presidential influence over independent agencies. 
Benefit payments for SSA programs are part of the federal 
government’s mandatory spending because the SSA is statutorily 
required to pay them.236  The benefits the SSA programs pay are 
therefore placed outside the annual appropriations process.237  Congress 
does, however, control funding for the SSA’s administrative budget, 
arguably providing Congress with some influence of the agency.238  But 
the annual budget for the SSA prepared by the Commissioner is 
submitted to Congress by the President “without revision,”239 depriving 
the President any leverage over the SSA’s activities.240  The SSA’s 
 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43391.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6RQ-TQPU] (noting that funding an 
agency outside of the appropriations process “shield[s] an agency from congressional control and 
presidential direction,” which “might further insulate the agency from partisan political influence”); 
see also Barkow, supra note 194, at 43 (“[T]he power of the purse is one of the key ways in which 
democratic accountability is served.” (citation omitted)). 
 231. Barkow, supra note 194, at 42. 
 232. HOGUE ET AL., supra note 230, at 19. 
 233. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN 
CONGRESS 291 (1966) (“Once the Committee’s ability to hurt it is recognized, the most obvious way 
for the agency to ensure a favorable kind of relationship with the Committee is simply to do . . . what 
the Committee tells it to do.”); S. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, STUDY ON FEDERAL 
REGULATION: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 95-26, at 42 
(1st Sess. 1977) (“The appropriations process is the most potent form of Congressional 
oversight . . . .”). 
 234. PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Henderson, J., dissenting).  
 235. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 524 (2010) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting).  
 236. See MINDY R. LEVIT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33074, MANDATORY SPENDING 
SINCE 1962, at 1 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33074.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB5R-PE9A]. 
 237. See 42 U.S.C. § 904(b) (2012). 
 238. See id.  
 239. Id. § 904(b)(1)(A).  
 240. See Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640, 669 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en 
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funding structure therefore does not distinguish the agency from the 
FHFA or the CFPB.  In fact, none of the factors identified in this 
Comment distinguish the SSA’s structure from the structure of the FHFA 
or the CFPB for purposes of Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the removal 
power. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to the presidential removal power in 
PHH, if adopted by the Supreme Court, would raise serious questions 
about the constitutionality of the SSA’s structure because there is no 
meaningful distinction between the SSA and the CFPB (or the FHFA, for 
that matter).  First, like the CFPB and the FHFA, the SSA is led by a 
single individual: the SSA Commissioner.  The President may only 
remove the SSA Commissioner for cause.  Second, the SSA lacks a 
bipartisan balance requirement, removing a critical check on agency 
power.  Third, the SSA is not subject to oversight by a politically 
accountable body because the SSAB performs an advisory oversight role.  
Fourth, the SSA funding structure prevents presidential influence.  Thus, 
“[a]ll of that massive power” is “lodged in one person”—the SSA 
Commissioner—“who is not supervised, directed, or removable at will 
by the President.”241  From Judge Kavanaugh’s perspective, this 
excessive insulation from presidential control violates separation of 
powers.  Judge Kavanaugh’s solution: sever the for-cause removal 
provision.242 
But doubt about the SSA’s constitutional status is just one specific 
implication.  Judge Kavanaugh’s approach also lays the groundwork for 
invalidating all independent agencies, reviving a separation of powers 
that sharply constrains the modern administrative state.  If the Supreme 
Court adopts Judge Kavanaugh’s approach, it may become difficult to 
draw the lines in a way that preserves many longstanding administrative 
structures. 
Judge Kavanaugh assumes that presidential control over agencies 
would increase accountability and help preserve individual freedom.  It is 
worth asking whether conservative judges would be so eager to expand 
presidential control if President Barrack Obama were still in office.  
 
banc, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-422 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2019); see 
also Barkow, supra note 194, at 44 (“With independent funding, the agency is insulated from . . . the 
President.” (citation omitted)). 
 241. See PHH II, 881 F.3d 75, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
 242. See PHH I, 839 F.3d 1, 38–39 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
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Given our increasingly polarized political system, the notion that the 
President’s control over agencies makes them politically accountable 
seems quaint.  As Professor Gillian Metzger explained, aggrandizement 
of executive power in response to fears of unaccountable agency power 
“may simply worsen the problem, adding the President’s popular 
authority and political leadership to the mix of executive, legislative, and 
adjudicatory powers agencies wield on their own.”243 
 
 243. Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 37 (2017).  
